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NOTES
CONTRACT TO MAKE TRUST FOR
MINOR BENEFICIARY
McDaniel Title Co. v. Lemons'
When individuals in a divorce proceeding enter into a property settle-
ment, they often provide expressly for the minor children of the marriage.
If such provision includes an agreement to create a trust for the benefit of
the children, difficult issues involving the law of trusts, contracts, and do-
mestic relations arise. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western Dis-
trict grappled with these issues in a recent decision, McDaniel Title Co. v.
Lemons,2 where it held that divorced parents could not rescind a property
settlement agreement that required the creation of a trust for the benefit of
their minor children.3 The most significant aspect of the case is the court's
use, for the first time, of section 311 of the second Restatement of Con-
tracts.' Also important are the legal issues and concepts that led the court
to decide the case solely on contract law and to ignore the law of trusts and
domestic relations-other possible avenues of decision.5
1. 626 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
2. Id
3. Id at 692.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981).
5. The court's discussion dealt primarily with the trust and contract elements
in the case. This Note will also focus on those areas, but another interesting aspect
of the case was the effect of the incorporation of an agreement in a property settle-
ment into a divorce decree. The court considered the issue but did not discuss it:
The parties have briefed and argued issues with respect to the nature of
the trust and the effect of the November, 1977 stipulation and the trial
court modification of the decree. Those issues need not be reached or de-
cided in view of the scope of review and the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law entered by the trial court.
626 S.W.2d at 689-90. The terms of a divorce decree are enforceable as any other
judgment in Missouri. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.325.5 (1978). It may be argued,
then, that the children's rights under the property settlement agreement were vested
because the property settlement merged into the decree of the court. As one com-
mentator explains, "If the separation agreement is 'incorporated' in the divorce de-
cree, the courts find that the contractual obligations of the agreement are converted
into obligations based upon the decree by the process called 'merger.' " H. CLARK,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 16.12 (1968). The children's rights, in this
view, flowed from the judgment of the court, not the intent of the parents. Courts,
however, do not have the power to incorporate a property settlement into a divorce
decree unless the specific provision is enforceable absent the stipulated property
1
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The case began when Bill and Sharon Carnes entered into a property
settlement, which was incorporated into their divorce decree.6 Under the
terms of the settlement, they held their marital home as tenants in com-
mon.7 The home was to be sold when Sharon either remarried or no longer
had custody of at least one minor child of her marriage to Bill. After the
sale, Sharon would receive one-half of the proceeds, while the other half
would be placed in trust for the benefit of the minor children.8 Sharon was
awarded custody of the children, and Bill was ordered to pay $100 a week
in child support.9 Bill became delinquent in his child support payments in
the amount of $3,900. Subsequently, Sharon married Dale Lemons. In-
stead of selling the home-as required by their prior agreement-Sharon
and Bill entered into a stipulation that Bill would convey his interest in the
home to Sharon as consideration for a release of the past due child support
payments.'0 Bill and his new wife executed a special warranty deed con-
veying their interest in the home to Sharon. In conjunction with this agree-
ment, the circuit court issued an order modifying the divorce decree
regarding the custody and child support of Bill and Sharon's children. The
order was silent regarding the disposal of the marital home and merely rati-
settlement. In Chappell v. Nash, 399 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. App., K.C. 1965), the court
held that where the property settlement provided that the husband would make
payments extending beyond his death, enforcement of the payments as alimony was
beyond the scope of the court's authority. The wife's remedy was to enforce the
settlement as a contract. Id at 256-57. Because the court in Lemons found that the
children were donee beneficiaries, the promise to create a trust was a gift to the
children. Since it is doubtful that a court can compel the giving of a gift, the chil-
dren could not enforce the trust as a decree of the court.
6. 626 S.W.2d at 688.
7.- Id In the absence of a settlement, courts usually may not leave the dividing
parties as tenants in common because the Dissolution of Marriage Act requires a
complete severance of all unity of property. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (1978),
construed in Davis v. Davis, 544 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976). The
court may allow a tenancy in common, however, if the economics of the situation
demand it. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 805 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
8. 626 S.W.2d at 688. The specific terms of the property settlement, as incor-
porated into the divorce decree, were as follows:
The wife shall have the right to continue to live in the house so long as she
remains unmarried and has custody of at least one of the unmarried minor
children. At such time as the wife shall remarry or should no longer have
custody of at least one unmarried minor child, the house shall be sold and
the proceeds shall be divided as follows: One-half to the wife and one-half
to Paul Warren, Trustee for the children born of the parties under the
terms of the Trust set out in the next paragraph of this agreement.
Id
9. Id
10. Id at 689. The relevant portion of this stipulation recites the terms of the
original agreement and states that no trust was ever established under it.
[Vol. 48
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CONTRACT FOR TRUST
fled the divorce decree in all other respects.1 '
Dale and Sharon later contracted to sell the house. McDaniel Title
Co. (McDaniel) issued a preliminary title report subsequent to the earnest
money contract but withheld title insurance coverage for claims that might
arise out of the divorce. 2 The sale of the home was completed, and the
proceeds came to $31,078. The new owners' mortgagee requested that Mc-
Daniel delete the exception from its final title insurance policy. Pursuant to
this request, the mortagee deposited half the proceeds with McDaniel.'3
Following claims by several parties to the money, McDaniel filed an inter-
pleader action 14 to determine who had rights to it."
The first issue before the trial court was whether the property settle-
ment agreement created an immediate trust for the benefit of the children.
If so, the parents did not have the power to modify or revoke it. Once a
trust has been created, the settlor does not have the power to modify it
unless the terms of the trust so provide' 6 -and the terms of the property
settlement did not allow for modification of the trust by Bill or Sharon.17
To create a valid express trust (other than a self-declaration of trust) it
is necessary that some interest or property be transferred to the trustee.' 8
The rationale for this requirement may be found in the origins and develop-
11. Id
12. The preliminary title report issued by a title insurer states the requirements
under which the insurer will agree to issue a policy. The insurer may list exemp-
tions from the coverage if there are problems with the title. See Mo. BAR C.L.E.,
INSURANCE PRACTICE § 8.13 (2d ed. 1976); Mo. BAR C.L.E., REAL ESTATE PRAC-
TICE § 14 (2d ed. 1972). In Lemons, McDaniel would not insure against claims that
might arise out of the divorce, presumably because it believed that there was a
significant chance that claims under the property settlement agreement could pre-'
vail. 626 S.W.2d at 688.
13. 626 S.W.2d at 688. McDaniel apparently requested the money before issu-
ance of the policy to establish a fund from which it could satisfy any claims against
the property arising out of the divorce.
14. Interpleader actions in Missouri are governed by Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 507.060 (1978). The plaintiff-McDaniel, in this case-must be a disinterested
stakeholder, have control of the fund, act in good faith, and have a real doubt as to
which claimants are entitled to the fund. Clay County Court v. Baker, 210 Mo.
App. 65, 70-71, 241 S.W. 447, 449 (K.C. 1922).
15. 626 S.W.2d at 688. The named defendants in the action were Sharon and
Dale Lemons, Paul Warren (the trustee named in the original property settlement
agreement), and the six children. The children, who were minors, were represented
by guardians ad litem appointed by the court under Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.02.
16. See Watson v. Payne, 143 Mo. App. 721, 726, 128 S.W. 238, 240 (K.C.
1910); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 145 (5th ed. 1973).
17. 626 S.W.2d at 688.
18. The trial court in Lemons explained it this way:
[A] trust must arise at the time it is attempted to be created, instead of
being brought forth by subsequent and independent circumstances. ...
In order to create a valid express trust it is necessary that some estate or
1983]
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ment of the trust device. A trust is a relationship between two persons in
which one, the trustee, holds property for the benefit of the other, the bene-
ficiary. 9 The ancestor of the modern trust was the "use," which was devel-
oped in England in the thirteenth century.2" The owner of real property
would enfeoff (transfer) the land to the feoffee to uses (the trustee) who
would hold the land for the benefit of the cestui que use (the beneficiary).2'
The trustee had seisin in the property, while the beneficiary had the use of
the property.2 2 The use was first generally employed when property was
conveyed to the use of Franciscan friars, but by the fifteenth century, con-
veying property for the use of others had become common practice in Eng-
land.2 3 The beneficiary escaped the expense associated with holding legal
title,24 and, since the use was enforced by courts of equity, he had the bene-
fits of ownership.25 Because the transfer to the use of another was a convey-
ance of an estate in land, legal title had to be vested in the trustee. This
took place upon the transfer of the property to the trustee. Thus, the mod-
ern requirement developed that as a prerequisite to the creation of an ex-
press trust, the trust property be immediately transferred to the trustee.' 6
interest be conveyed to the trustee, and when the instrument creating the
trust is other than a Will, that estate or interest must pass immediately.
McDaniel Title Co. v. Lemons, No. CV180-76CC, slip. op. at 3 (Clay County Cir.
Ct. Aug. 15, 1980) (quoting Trouty v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 596, 46 S.W.2d 135, 138
(1932)), rev'd, 626 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981). See also State ex rel. Union
Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Blair, 350 Mo. 622, 623, 166 S.W.2d 1085, 1086 (1943);
Brannock v. Magoon, 141 Mo. App. 316, 125 S.W. 535 (K.C. 1910).
19. Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 414, 167 S.W. 634, 636 (Spr. 1914).
20. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 2; 1 A. ScoTr, THE LAw OF
TRUSTS § 1.3 (3d ed. 1967). For a discussion of the development and use of trust
devices, see generally Fratcher, Uses of Uses, 34 Mo. L. REv. 39 (1969).
21. 1 G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 2 (2d ed. 1965).
22. "Seisin" meant possession, but it involved "much more than what we ordi-
narily think of as possession"-including a wide variety of feudal rights and duties.
Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin, 34 HARV. L. REV. 592, 593 (1921). The use, on the
other hand, "was a personal right against the feofee to uses or his successors. More
fundamentally, it was something that charged his conscience." Id at 597.
23. 1 A. SCOTr, supra note 20, § 1.3.
24. Under the feudal law in force in medieval England, the overlord was enti-
tled to primer seisin or relief, usually a payment in money, when the title to the
land descended to the heir of the person seised. If the tenure was military and the
heir was a minor, the overlord was entitled to possession and the rents and profits
during the minority of the heir and could control the heir's remarriage. Only the
death of the holder of the legal title, the feoffee to uses, gave rise to these obliga-
tions; no feudal dues arose on the death of the owner of the equitable estate, the
cestui que use. G. BOGERT & . BOGERT, supra note 16, § 2.
25. 1 A. ScoTr, supra note 20, § 1.4.
26. To be enforceable, a trust must be fully executed, i.e., the property com-
prising the trust res must be transferred to the trustee in such a fashion as will
effectively pass title. State ex rel. Kansas City Theological Seminary v. Elliston, 216
[Vol. 48
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The Lemons trial court held that no trust was created by the property
settlement agreement because there was no transfer of property to the
trustee.27 The court of appeals agreed, concluding that it was evident from
the facts that the trust did not arise immediately when the property settle-
ment was entered into.28 The court reasoned that although half the sale
proceeds were to constitute the res of the trust, these proceeds could not
have been transferred into the trust when the property settlement was exe-
cuted, because at that time the proceeds did not exist.29
Having decided that the children had no claim under trust law, the
trial court turned to contract theory. It held that the children were not
beneficiaries of the third party beneficiary contract, which it characterized
as gratuitous, and therefore had no right of enforcement. 30 The court of
S.W. 967, 969 (1919). In a self-declaration of trust, where the donor is himself the
trustee, no transfer of title is required. Id Lemons did not involve a self-declaration.
27. McDaniel Title Co. v. Lemons, No. CV180-76CC, slip. op. at 3 (Clay
County Cir. Ct. Aug 15, 1980).
28. 626 S.W.2d at 688.
29. Id It is evident that the property settlement agreement did not create a
valid express trust of one-half of the proceeds, because the proceeds were not trans-
ferred immediately to the trustee. Sharon and Bill, had they desired to do so, could
have structured the property settlement to create an immediate trust. "A trust may
be created by. . . a promise by one person to another person whose rights there-
under are to be held in trust for a third person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 17(e) (1959). A trustee of an enforceable promise which is to be per-
formed at some future date can hold that promise in trust for a third person. Bill
and Sharon could thus have structured the settlement so that the trustee would
receive a present trust of the promise (the contract right) that upon the sale of the
house, one-half the proceeds would be transferred to him as trustee for the children.
In this situation, the trust property is the promise itself.
If a person makes an enforceable promise to pay money or to make a
conveyance of property to another person as trustee a present trust is cre-
ated, the rights of the promisee being held by him as trustee, provided
that the person creating the trust manifested an intention to create an
immediate trust of the promisee's rights, and not merely to create a trust
of the money when paid or of the property when conveyed.
Id. § 26 comment n. It is clear that Bill and Sharon did n6t intend to create a
present trust of the promise contained in the property settlement. The settlement
language was conditional: "If the trust established ... comes into existence."
626 S.W.2d at 688 (emphasis added). The language does not indicate any intent of
the parties that there was to be a present trust of the promise.
30. McDaniel Title Co. v. Lemons, No. CV180-76CC, slip. op. at 4 (Clay
County Cir. Ct. Aug. 15, 1980). The trial court noted that "an expectation or hope
of receiving property in the future cannot be held in trust." Id (quoting Edgar v.
Fitzpatrick, 377 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Mo. 1964)). The court continued:
Under the facts of this case, the only interest the children had in the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the house were those interests able to be passed from
Mr. Warren as the prospective trustee onto them. Since Mr. Warren was
unable to hold (for the children) in trust any interest of receiving property
1983]
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appeals, in reversing this determination, found that the children were, in
fact, third party donee beneficiaries of the contract and had the right to
enforce the trust.3 '
A promise to transfer property in trust at some future date is enforcea-
ble if the promise meets the requirements of an enforceable contract.3" A
contract to create a trust is thus enforced under general contract princi-
ples.33 In order to enforce a contract, there must be sufficient consideration
for the promises given between the parties.34 Consideration that will sup-
port an ordinary contract will also support a contract to create a trust.35
The Lemons court held that the property settlement was supported by con-
sideration, finding it in the mutual promises and undertakings of Bill and
Sharon.3" The contract was valid.
The court next turned to the question whether the children had the
right to enforce the contract. Sharon's remarriage fulfilled one of the condi-
tions precedent 37 to the sale of the home and the creation of the trust. The
trial court decided that the only beneficiary38 of the property settlement
in the future the children could not have been beneficiaries of the gratui-
tous third party beneficiary contract.
Id
31. 626 S.W.2d at 690-92.
32. Penny v. White, 594 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Mo. App., W.D. 1950); Taylor v,
Welch, 168 Mo. App. 223, 234, 153 S.W. 490, 493 (K.C. 1913); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 30 (1959); 1 G. BOGERT, supra note 21, § 204.
33. 1 A. Scorr, supra note 20, § 14.1. English courts take a different approach
concerning enforceability of contracts for the benefit of third parties. In England, a
third party beneficiary ordinarily may not enforce the contract because he gave no
consideration for it. Id § 14.4. See also Matheson, The Enforceability of a Covenant to
Create a Trust, 29 MOD. L. REv. 397 (1966).
34. See Miller v. Bennett, 237 Mo. App. 1285, 1293, 172 S.W.2d 960, 963 (K.C.
1943). Consideration for a promise is either a benefit or advantage received by the
promisor from the promisee or a detriment sustained by the promisee. See
Brountow v. Wollard, 66 Mo. App. 636, 641-42 (K.C. 1896).
35. Taylor v. Welch, 168 Mo. App. 223, 233, 153 S.W. 490, 493' (K.C. 1913).
This is not the case in England. The High Court of Chancery would not enforce a
contract to create a trust unless there was fair consideration. See In re Ellenborough,
[1903] 1 Ch. 697, 700; 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 86.1.
36. 626 S.W.2d at 690 (citing Penny v. White, 594 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1980)). The consideration did not arise merely from Bill's relinquishment of
his right to a share of the sale proceeds. It was, instead, the actual separation of the
marital property and the surrender of rights arising from the marriage contained in
the property settlement agreement. Sharon Carnes also contributed to the trust by
making all mortgage payments on the property. Since this property division and
surrender of rights was the consideration for the promise to create a trust, the con-
tract was no longer executory. The consideration forthe promise had already been
given.
37. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 250 comment c (1932).
38. It should be noted that the term "beneficiary" is used in two different ways
6
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was the trustee, so only he could enforce the contract." The court of ap-
peals, however, held that the children were third party donee beneficiaries
of the contract and had a right to enforce it.4"
A third party donee beneficiary is a person who may enforce a contract
for his benefit, even though he is not a party to the contract and has pro-
vided no consideration for the benefit he receives.4" The donee benefici-
ary's right to enforce the contract and recover against the promisor rests on
the promisee's intent that the third party should receive the beneficial per-
formance of the contract as a gift.4 2 Therefore, a third party may enforce a
contract that is for his benefit.4 3 The test for an enforceable third party
beneficiary contract is whether the promisee intended to make a gift of the
benefits of the contract to the third party.4 4 Employing this analysis, the
court of appeals pointed out the error in the trial court's decision: the fun-
damental nature of a trust is the division of legal and equitable title.4 5 It is
"in the very nature of the contract to make an express trust that there will
by the court in this discussion. The court refers to the trustee as the contract benefici-
ary; the court believed that the children, the trust beneficiaries, were not, in fact, the
contract beneficiaries of the property settlement agreement.
39. McDaniel Title Co. v. Lemons, No. CV180-76CC, slip. op. at 3 (Clay
County Cir. Ct. Aug 15, 1980).
40. 626 S.W.2d at 690.
41. Stephens v. Great Southern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 421 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1967). RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932) provides that a per-
son is a donee beneficiary
if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying
circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise
of all or part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary
or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some performance
neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the
beneficiary.
42. LaClede Investment Corp. v. Kaiser, 596 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Mo. App., E.D.
1980).
43. See Rogers v. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589, 590 (1875); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v.
Rainey, 353 Mo. 477, 483, 182 S.W.2d 624, 626 (1944). RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 135(a) (1932) provides that "a gift promise in a contract creates a duty of
the promisor to the donee beneficiary to perform the promise, and the duty can be
enforced by the donee beneficiary for his own benefit." For a general discussion of
third party contracts in Missouri, see Comment, Third Party Beneftciar Contracts in
Missouri, 25 Mo. L. REv. 71 (1960).
44. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 353 Mo. 477, 485, 182 S.W.2d 624, 626
(1944); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(a) (1932).
45. 626 S.W.2d at 690. In an express trust, there is a separation of the legal
and beneficial ownership of the property. The legal interests in the trust res are
held by the trustee for the benefit of the trust beneficiary. The beneficiary owns an
equitable interest in the res, which is the right to receive the benefits he is entitled to
under the terms of the trust. See Farmers State Bank of Fosston v. Sig Ellingson &
Co., 218 Minn. 411, 416, 16 N.W.2d 319, 322 (1944).
1983]
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be dual beneficiaries of the contract, the trustee as to the legal title and the
beneficiaries as to the equitable title.",4 6 Therefore, the parents' intention
that their children benefit from the contract gave the children the right to
enforce it.
The question then became whether the contract, though enforceable,
could be rescinded by the parents. In its decision, the court focused on two
key factors which caused the contract to be irrevocable: the status of the
beneficiaries as minors and the intent of the parents when they executed the
agreement.4 7
The general common law rule is that parties to a third party benefici-
ary contract can rescind or modify the contract at any time before the third
party beneficiary accepts the contract or acts upon it to his detriment,48
The majority view is that the beneficiary's rights become vested upon his
acceptance of the contract, and it cannot be rescinded without his con-
sent.49 However, there is a strong minority view that the donee benefici-
ary's rights become indefeasible immediately upon the making of the
contract.5 ° Earlier cases are not clear as to which approach is followed in
Missouri.5 1
There is an exception to the majority view in cases where the third
46. 626 S.W.2d at 690.
47. Id at 691-92.
48. See Hannan v. Murphy, 198 Iowa 827, 831, 200 N.W. 418, 420 (1924); Mor-
rison v. Barry, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 22, 27, 30 S.W. 376, 377-78 (1895).
49. See, e.g., James v. Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 747, 328 P.2d 1023, 1028
(1958); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 266 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Ky. 1953); Spates v. Spates, 267
Md. 72, 78-79, 296 A.2d 581, 584 (1972).
50. 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 396 (3d ed.
1959). See Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 526, 93 N.W. 440, 443 (1903).
This approach supposes that a third party donee beneficiary contract is analogous
to a gift of property. Because a gift is a pure benefit to the donee, his acceptance is
presumed, thus denying the contracting parties the right to rescind the contract.
See Page, The Power of the Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering Performance
to a Third Person, 12 Wis. L. REV. 141, 183-84 (1937); Contracts-Third Party Benefci-
aq Contract-When a Rzght Vests in a Donee Benefriajy, 44 Ky. L.J. 470, 473-74 (1956).
51. Before Lemons, there were apparently only two Missouri cases dealing with
the problem of when a third party beneficiary's rights become fixed and are no
longer subject to modification by the contracting parties without the beneficiary's
consent. In Rogers v. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589 (1875), the court stated that "it is a
presumption of law that when a promise is made for the benefit of a third person he
accepts it, and to overthrow this presumption a dissent must be shown." Id at 591.
This is similar to the minority approach outlined in note 50 supra. In the more
recent case of Schoen v. Lange, 238 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Mo. App., St. L. 1951), the
court held that the defendant could no longer rescind the third party beneficiary
contract because the beneficiary had accepted it. This appears to imply adoption of
the majority rule that parties may rescind the contract until its acceptance by the
beneficiary. See Comment, supra note 43, at 77. The Lemons court implicitly re-
turned to the minority approach of Rogers, since under the majority rule the parents
[Vol. 48
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party beneficiary is a minor. The child's acceptance of the contract benefits
is presumed, which prevents the original parties from rescinding the con-
tract5 2 unless the right to rescind was specifically reserved in the contract.5 3
Applying this rule, the Lemons court found that, since the parents did not
reserve the right to modify or rescind the contract and the beneficiaries
were minor children, the contract was irrevocable.
5 4
The court found an additional basis for its decision in section 311 of
the second Restatement of Contracts. Section 311 provides that parties to a
contract for the benefit of a third party may rescind the contract at any
time prior to the third party's acceptance, unless there is a specific term in
the contract to the contrary.55 Failure of a party to secure an adult benefi-
ciary's acceptance of the contract may indicate that the contract was in-
tended to be revocable," but an infant's inability to contract renders this
approach inappropriate since he is unable to effectively accept. The Re-
statement solution is to rely on the manifested intention of the original par-
ties, i.e., whether they intended that the contract be irrevocable. 7 Under
this analysis, the parents would retain the power to rescind the contract
unless it was their intention when they entered into the settlement that the
trust provision be irrevocable.
The Lemons court found that the parents had intended the agreement
to be complete and irrevocable.5" The court noted that there are circum-
stances that would rebut the inference that a minor beneficiary's rights
would have lost their right to revoke immediately upon the making of the contract,
and the court would not be required to analyze the issues further.
52. James v. Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 747, 328 P.2d 1023, 1028 (1958);
Waterman v. Morgan, 114 Ind. 237, 240, 16 N.E. 590, 592 (1888); Rhodes v.
Rhodes, 266 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Ky. 1953); Spates v. Spates, 267 Md. 72, 78-79,
296 A.2d 581, 585 (1972); Quinn v. Thigpen, 266 N.C. 720, 724, 147 S.E.2d 191,
194 (1966); Plunkett v. Atkins, 371 P.2d 727, 731-32 (Okla. 1962); Brill v. Brill, 282
Pa. 276, 283, 127 A. 840, 843 (1925). The rule stems from the minor's lack of capac-
ity to contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 comment d (1981).
53. Spates v. Spates, 267 Md. 72, 78, 296 A.2d 581, 585 (1972).
54. 626 S.W.2d at 692.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981) provides:
(1) Discharge or modification of a duty to an intended beneficiary
by conduct of the promisee or by a subsequent agreement between prom-
isor and promisee is ineffective if a term of the promise creating the duty
so provides.
(2) In the absence of such a term, the promisor and promisee retain
power to discharge or modify the duty by subsequent agreement.
(3) Such a power terminates when the beneficiary, before he re-
ceives notification of the discharge or modification, materially changes his
position in justifiable reliance on the promise or brings suit on it or
manifests assent to it at the request of the promisor or promisee.
56. Id § 311 comment d.
57. Id
58. 626 S.W.2d at 692.
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under a contract are irrevocable, including the situation where the consid-
eration for the promise is executory.5 9 From that proposition, the court
apparently concluded that the reverse is true: a third party beneficiary's
rights are vested when the consideration for the contract is executed. Be-
cause the property settlement involved a bargain fully performed, the con-
sideration was not executory.6" The court therefore concluded that the
parties intended the agreement to be irrevocable. 6' When the home was
sold, the court said, a trust consisting of half the proceeds arose for the
children.
62
While the Lemons court purported to rely on section 311 of the Restate-
ment only in the alternative, it really seems to be using this approach to
formulate a new framework for dealing with the problems presented in this
type of case. The court specifically pointed out that section 311 has decided
advantages over the common law approach, chiefly in avoiding the unin-
tended and inequitable results it believed were attendant upon the older
rule.63 Section 311 also gives a court greater flexibility to examine each
case individually and arrive at a fair result rather than relying on a broad
rule that can result in inequity in specific cases. This very flexibility may be
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 comment d (1981). Illus-
tration 4 to the comment is taken from Lehman v. Stout, 261 Minn. 384, 112
N.W.2d 640 (1961), in which the parents of an infant boy moved onto the farm of
the father's uncle. They entered into a contract that the father would care for the
uncle until his death. In return, the uncle would pay the father a salary and would
convey a specific portion of the farm to the son when he reached 21. The uncle
later conveyed a part of the farm to the father in satisfaction of his obligation under
the agreement. The court held that the son had no vested interest in the contract
and the contract could be rescinded since the consideration was still executory. Id
at 393-94, 112 N.W.2d at 646.
60. See note 36 supra.
61. 626 S.W.2d at 692.
62. Id Although this is what the court said, it is inaccurate. A trust does not
arise merely because there is a contract to make one. It arises-except in cases of
self-declaration--only when the transfer is made. But the contract to make a trust
may be specifically enforced. See 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 26.5. The trust in
Lemons would actually arise when the court specifically enforced the agreement in
the property settlement.
63. 626 S.W.2d at 692. In some instances, presuming acceptance of the con-
tract by an infant would lead to inequity. An example, given by the court, is when
parents provide for their children's benefit by contract. The old rule would pro-
hibit parents from altering or rescinding that contract even if more children are
born or there are other important changes in the family situation. Id Under § 311,
however, the parents could modify the contract to meet new contingencies unless
the court finds that they intended the contract to be irrevocable. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981). The Reporters Note to this section pro-
vides its own reason for the rule: there should be no distinction between donee
beneficiaries and creditor beneficiaries with respect to the power of the promisor
and promisee to vary the contract.
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a drawback, however, since it can cause uncertainty for contracting par-
ties.64 On the whole, the adoption of section 311 in Missouri will enable
courts to reach results consistent with both fairness and the intent of the
parties.
DANIEL B. SCHELP
64. This uncertainty, however, does not weigh strongly against the new ap-
proach because the contracting parties can clearly manifest their intentions in the
contract itself by stating whether the contract is or is not subject to modification or
revocation.
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